DE FACTO CENSORSHIP: ADULT CONTENT VIDEO

SCRAMBLING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Megan G. Rosenberger

When Alexander Hamilton wrote the Federalist
Papers, he anticipated a time would come when
the legislature would overstep its bounds.' And
just as he predicted, the courts would be in place
to rectify the situation when legislation ran contrary to the Constitution. Congress has implicated
this very situation by enacting section 505 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,2 which is intended to protect children but may do so at the
expense of First Amendment freedoms.
The lower courts, acting in their intermediary
capacity, have reviewed this legislation and found
it contrary to the rights embodied in the Constitution. Now the Supreme Court, the ultimate intermediary, will determine the final outcome of this
contentious debate. The Supreme Court heard
oral arguments for United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,3 in November 1999 and is
4
expected to issue an opinion by summer 2000.
Congress enacted section 505 to deal with a
phenomenon on cable television known as signal
bleed, which occurs when portions of the audio
or video of a particular channel can be viewed
although a subscriber has not requested that particular channel. 5 Signal bleed is particularly prob-

lematic when subscribers receive programming
from adult channels despite scrambling by the
cable operator, in homes where such content is
unexpected. By enacting restrictive legislation,
Congress sought to protect children from accidentally viewing indecent programming, ensuring
that they would not be exposed to such signal
bleed from adult channels. 6
Although the government's intent to protect
children is laudable, section 505 is overbroad because it interferes with adults' recognized First
Amendment right to watch indecent programming. As Alexander Hamilton predicted, when
the Constitution and a piece of legislation are at
odds, the Constitution must prevail. In this situation, the First Amendment must trump section

I See Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 78.
It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were
designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to
keep the later within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact,
and must be regarded as the judges as, a fundamental
law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its mean-

& Supp. III 1997)).
3 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 30
F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Del. 1998).
4 See Joan Biskupic, Justices Hear Arguments on Cable Smut
Restrictions, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at A4.
5
See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
945 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Del. 1996) (discussing section 505
and its attempt to eliminate signal bleed). The district court's
opinion noted the "extensive and complex testimony" that it
heard "regarding cable technology and the mechanisms
available to comply with 505." Id.
6 Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. at 136 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997); see also 141 CONG. REC. S8166-69 (statements
of Sens. Feinstein and Lott).
7
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing in part that "Con-

ing as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to

be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that
which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of
course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention
of the people to the intention of their agents.

Id.

2
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, Pub. L. No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 136 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994

7

505.

This note explores the constitutionality of section 505's restrictions on adult programming and
its effect on the cable services industry. Part I of
this note explains the procedural background and
legislative history of section 505, particularly why
Congress deemed it necessary to regulate this
problem and the practical implications of the regulation. Part II explores the progression of the

gress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of

speech").

COMMLAW CONSPECTUS

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. ("Playboy") case in
the district court, from the denial of a preliminary
injunction allowing section 505 to go into effect,
to the declaratory judgment preventing its enforcement. Part III illustrates the prior law relevant to this case; specifically, how regulations of
speech are examined as content-based regulations, time/place/manner regulations or obscenity regulations. Part IV analyzes the issues the

Supreme Court will grapple with when it determines the outcome of Playboy. Finally, this note
suggests how the Court should resolve the issues
raised in the case.

"scramble" the signal as it is transmitted into
homes where subscribers have not requested the
channels so that they do not receive a discernable
signal. 14

Section 505 addresses the problem that arises
when the signal does not fully scramble and the
nonsubscribers can see or hear portions of the
programming on these channels.' 5 This problem,
the "partial reception of images and/or sounds
on a scrambled channel," is known as "signal
bleed."' 16 The severity and pervasiveness of signal
bleed varies by place and time as weather, equipment or human error contribute to the problem.

I.

THE CREATION OF SECTION 505

A.

Why the Need for Section 505?

B.
To understand the constitutional challenge at
issue, an exploration of the technical aspects of
signal bleed is necessary. A multisystem operator
("MSO") is a cable provider that packages available cable channels for distribution to subscribers.8 Generally, MSOs offer different packages of
a variety of channels, including blocks of basic
packages and premium channels for which subscribers pay an additional fee. 9' Additionally,
MSOs generally offer programming on a "pay-perview" basis, in which a subscriber places an order
for a specific program or period of time.10 Among
these premium and pay-per-view channels, the
MSO may offer the Playboy Channel and other
adult programming channels."
MSOs receive the signals for these channels
from a variety of sources, amplify the signals and
then retransmit them over coaxial cable into the
homes of cable subscribers. 12 Although premium
channels are transmitted from the cable head-end
to the homes of all cable subscribers,' 3 MSOs
8 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
945 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Del. 1996).
9 See id.
10 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 706.

When an order for a pay-per-view program is received, the
MSO unscrambles the signal for the viewing period and then
rescrambles the signal by remotely accessing a converter box
in the subscriber's home. See id.
I'

See id.

12

See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United

States, 918 F. Supp. 813, 817 (D. Del. 1996).

13
14

See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 777.
See 47 U.S.C. § 560 (1994 & Supp. I 1997) (defining

scrambling as rearranging the contents of a signal "so that

the programming cannot be viewed or heard in an under-
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17

Congress Takes Action

Congress decided to intervene and regulate
adult programming signal bleed by enacting section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996.18 This statute requires MSOs to fully scramble sexually explicit adult programming or other
indecent programming that is transmitted on
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming. '19 The amendment's goal is
to "protect children by prohibiting sexually explicit programming to those individuals who have
not specifically requested such programming.

2°

Senators Diane Feinstein and Trent Lott proposed the legislation on June 12, 1995.21 Senator
Lott stated that it was needed because "cable systems across the country are sending uninvited,
sexually explicit and pornographic programming
into the homes." 22 He referenced studies proving
that young people were "acting out the behavior
23
they are seeing in this type of programming,"
although no actual studies were produced at the

standable manner"); see also 47 C.F.R. § 227(e) (1998).
15
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 777.
16
Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 776.
17 See id. at 778.
18 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
19 Id. at § 505, 47 U.S.C. § 561(a).
20
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710 (D. Del. 1998) (quoting 141 CONG.
REC. S8166-69, S8167 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Feinstein)).
21
See generally 141 CONG. REC. S8166-69 (statements of
Sens. Feinstein and Lott).
22
Id. at S8169 (statement of Sen. Lott).
23
Id.
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hearing. 24 Senator Lott also suggested that the
rape of a six-year-old child by an eight-year-old
and a ten-year-old was the result of these children
being exposed to adult programming. 25 Little evidence was presented on the Senate floor;
although the regulation was referred to as "a very
simple amendment," there was no discussion of its
First Amendment implications. 26 Thus, proposed
Amendment 1269 to the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") ultimately became section 505
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.27
Congress perceived a need to further protect
the nation's children in section 505, although another section of the Telecommunications Act of
28
1996 already offers a solution to signal bleed.
Section 504 requires MSOs to fully scramble or
block the audio and video signals received by a
cable subscriber upon the cable subscriber's request. 29 Because this service must be provided
free of charge, a family that wants to avoid signal
bleed has only to ask. 30 Nevertheless, Congress
concluded that families do not fully understand
the signal bleed problem and that the government must take the initiative to protect the na31
tion's children.
In effect, section 505 requires MSOs to take
costly measures 32 to block the signals for all subscribers regardless of the subscriber's lack of concern about signal bleed.3 3 Although this statute
passed with no floor debate in Congress, 34 it has
proved to be a controversial topic in the courts.

See id.
See id.
26
See id.
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 709.
27
28
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C.
§ 560(a) (stating, "Upon request by a cable service subscriber, a cable operator shall, without charge, fully scramble
or otherwise fully block the audio and video programming of
each channel carrying such programming so that a subscriber does not receive it").
29
See id.
30
See id.
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 710.
31
32
See id. at 711 (stating that section 505 gives all MSOs
the "option of upgrading its technology from analog to digital transmission, of time-channeling, or of distributing channel-mapping capable converters, lockboxes, or positive or
negative traps to all their customers").
33
See id. at 712 (stating that less than one-half of one per-

Practical Impact of Section 505

C.

The statute in question requires MSOs to fully
scramble for nonsubscribers any adult programming networks. 35 However, the varieties of cable
technology currently in use for most systems
makes complete scrambling either impossible or
36
highly inefficient.
The majority of MSOs use "RF" or "baseband"
technology to scramble the signal of pay-per-view
channels that cable subscribers do not wish to receive.37 However, this type of scrambling, without
modification, is generally capable of making indis38
cernable only the video portion of the signal.
Other popular options include positive trapping,
in which the entire signal is scrambled from the
cable head-end and subscribers to the channel
must use a device installed at the home to unscramble the signal,3 9 or negative trapping, in

which the signal is transmitted clearly but a negative trap is installed in the homes of nonsubscribers to block the signal. 40 Additionally, MSOs that
provide pay-per-view service may utilize a system
of addressable converters, which the MSO can remotely access to send a signal that scrambles and
41
unscrambles the signal upon demand.

Signal bleed occurs in a variety of situations, depending on the scrambling technology used. In
systems that use RF or baseband technology, signal bleed will occur because those technologies
may not be capable of scrambling the audio sig-

24

34

25

35

cent of all cable subscribers requested lockboxes as per

§ 504).

See id. at 710.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.

§ 561.
See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
36
States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 778 (D. Del. 1996).
37
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
See id.
38
39
See id. Subscribers to cable systems that utilize a positive trap are given a device that is "attached to a cable-ready
TV or to the set-top converter box to filter out the jamming
signal." Id.
40
See id. The decision to use either positive or negative
trapping "will depend on whether the majority of subscribers
to the overall cable service also wish to subscribe to a particular premium service." Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F.
Supp. at 778.
41
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 778.
Although utilizing addressable converters would eradicate
the problem of signal bleed, the cost of instituting this remedy would be prohibitively high; addressable converters cost
approximately $115 per television set. See id.
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nal. 42 Signal bleed may also occur when subscribers use cable-ready television sets, which, unlike
older sets, do not contain a feature called chan43
nel-mapping that prevents signal bleed.
The pervasiveness of signal bleed from adult
channels is an issue about which the parties are in
dispute.4 4 In the government's argument against a
preliminary injunction, it presented statistical evidence showing the homes that potentially could
be exposed to signal bleed, 45 along with "anecdotal evidence of parents discovering that their children have been exposed to sights and sounds
from sexually explicit programming." 46 The statistics presented by the government illustrated that
of the approximate sixty-two million cable subscribing households in the United States, roughly
forty million of these households "have the potential for a 'bleed' problem." 4 7 However, the government's statistics are overly broad, as they include
those cable subscribers who could "potentially" be
exposed to signal bleed, not those who actually
have been exposed to signal bleed, nor how much
of the signal bleed stems from adult programming.48 During Playboy's declaratory judgment
phase, the court asked the government to present
further evidence of the problem, but it failed to
49
present any new evidence.
Section 505 forces MSOs to comply with the
regulation regardless of the existence or the extent of the problem. 50 Current technology however, provides MSOs with few viable alternatives to
facilitate compliance with the statute. 51 First, an
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 778.
"[W] hen a consumer with a cable-ready TV tunes to a scrambled premium channel to which the consumer does not subscribe, the consumer receives the jammed signal which
under some circumstances includes a video picture or portions of a video picture[,]" a phenomenon called random
lock-up. See id.
44
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
45
See id. (referring to the government's evidence that, of
the 62 million homes in the United States that receive cable
television, approximately 40 million subscribers do not have
blocking devices for signal bleed, so these 40 million homes
have the potential to receive signal bleed).
46
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
945 F. Supp. at 778.
47
Id. at 779.
48 See id. at 778-79.
49
See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d at 708-09 (noting that the government
did not present any "survey-type evidence on the magnitude
of the 'problem' ").
50
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. 1I1 1997).
42

43
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MSO may provide every subscriber of its service
with a channel lockbox programmed to completely block any signal from the specified adult
channel. 52 Although section 504 already requires
all MSOs to provide lockboxes to any cable subscriber upon request, 5" it may be infeasible to require that MSOs do so for all subscribers due to
54
the high cost of each box.

A second alternative for MSOs is double-scrambling.55 One form of double-scrambling uses RF

or baseband technology in addition to a positive
trap.5 6 Although this option is less costly than distributing a lockbox to all cable subscribers, it
would still cost MSOs 50 percent of their revenues
from adult programming channels. 57 During trial,

neither side presented evidence of any MSO that
chose to comply with the regulation by using
58
double scrambling.
MSOs could also avoid signal bleed by upgrading their networks from analog to digital. 59 How-

ever, digital cable service currently reaches only
two million American consumers. 60 Converting
entire analog cable systems to digital at this time
would cost in the billions of dollars, making this
the least feasible option.6
Notably, section 505 does provide MSOs with
an alternative until they comply with the statute; it
states that MSOs "shall limit the access of children
to [adult programming] ...by not providing such

programming during the hours of the day (as determined by the Commission) when a significant
number of children are likely to view it."62 The
51 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 706;
see also Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 780.
52
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 779.
53
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C.
§ 560 (1994 & Supp. 111 1997).
54 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
This has become a contentious issue among the parties in
this suit. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at *33, United States v.
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 [hereinafter
Supreme Court Appellant's Brief]; Oral Arguments at *4445, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No.
98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Supreme Court Oral
Argument].
5-5 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
56

See id.

57

See id.

58

See id.

See id. Bleed also does not occur when MSOs transmit
the cable signal in digital form. See Playboy Entertainment
Group, 945 F. Supp. at 778.
60
See id.
61
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
62
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (b).
59
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Federal Communications Commission later determined that the prohibited hours extend from six
a.m. to ten p.m.

63

The creation of this eight-hour

safe harbor period, called time-channeling, is relatively simple and has been the most popular
64
method of compliance among MSOs.

However, this restriction of adult programming
has caused difficulties for Playboy and other providers of adult programming. 65 The obvious problem with time-channeling is that while it does not
affect nonsubscribers, it prohibits subscribers
from viewing adult programs during the safe harbor hours. 66 This alternative also places a tremen67
dous financial burden on adult programmers.
Although the extent of the financial burden will
not be a crucial factor in determining whether the
statute passes First Amendment scrutiny, these alternatives demonstrate the extent of the burden
that this regulation imposes on the cable indus6
try's First Amendment opportunities.

II.

PLAYBOY'S CHALLENGE

Playboy initially applied for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent the implementation of section 505.69 Section 505 had
forced Playboy, as the provider of numerous adult
programming channels, to relegate all of its programming from regular programming hours to
the "safe harbor" hours. 7°, Playboy argued that this

restriction on broadcast of its programming was a
violation of the First Amendment. 7' The United
63
See In re Implementation of Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Scrambling of Sexually Explicit
Adult Video Service Programming, Orderand Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd. 5386, 5387, para. 6 (1996).
64
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at
711 (according to one survey, 69 percent of MSOs have resorted to time-channeling in order to comply with section

505).
65
See id. at 718 (explaining the significant burden that
time-channeling imposes, the court stated that "time-chan-

neling amounts to the removal of all sexually explicit programming ... during two-thirds of the broadcast day" and
"[s] ince 30-50 percent of all adult programming is viewed in
households prior to 10 p.m .... [section] 505 restricts a significant amount of protected speech").
66

See id. at 711.

67

See id. (noting that the elimination of viewing before

10 p.m. results in a potential loss of 15 percent of revenue
through 2007).
68 See id. at 712.

69

See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United

States, 918 F. Supp. 813 (D. Del. 1996).
70
See Appellee's Brief at *2, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999)

States District Court for the District of Delaware
granted the TRO, holding that Playboy demonstrated a "likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm if relief is denied, that the government will not be irreparably harmed if relief is
granted and that granting relief will not adversely
affect the public interest. '"7 2 The district court
stated that the "implementation of section 505
will have a 'chilling effect' on the adult-oriented
cable television industry. '73 Furthermore, the
court found that section 505 was not the least restrictive means by which the government could
achieve its goal of restricting children's access to
adult programming because it would cause irrepa74
rable harm to Playboy.
The court of appeals overturned the TRO and
held that the statute would survive a challenge on
its merits. 75 In making its decision, the court
stated that section 505 was a "carefully tailored,
and constitutional solution" to the problem asserted by the government. 7 6 It also recognized
that section 505 was not a complete ban on adult
programming and that the statute did not restrict
consenting adults from viewing the adult pro77
gramming.
The most substantial factor in the court's determination was the court's interpretation of FCC v.
8
Pacifica Foundation.7
In relying on that decision,
the court held that time-channeling was a viable
alternative for adult programming, channels because it was upheld by the Supreme Court as a
valid option in Pacifica.7 9 However, the Supreme
[hereinafter Supreme Court Appellee's Brief].
71
See id.at *1; U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
72
Playboy Entertainment Group, 918 F. Supp. at 822-23.
73
Id. at 821.
74 See id.
75
See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 792 (D. Del. 1996).
76
See id. at 787.
77
See id. at 789 (noting, "It is important to our reasoning
that § 505 does not seek to ban sexually explicit programming, nor does it prohibit consenting adults from viewing
erotic material on premium cable networks if they so desire").
78
See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978)
(upholding the FCC's regulation of a broadcast radio monologue that contained patently offensive sexual and excretory
language; the Court stated that although the language was
not obscene language that would normally receive minimal
First Amendment protection if any, this language nonetheless was "not entitled to absolute constitutional protection
under all circumstances").
79 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 945 F. Supp. at 789
(stating that since "the Supreme Court endorsed a timechanneling solution in very similar circumstances in Pacifica,
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Court's subsequent examination of content-based
restrictions since Pacifica raises the question of
whether Pacifica would be upheld in the context
of adult-oriented cable programming. 8" The
Court has noted that there are fundamental technological differences between cable television and
broadcast television (specifically, the cable industry does not contend with the limited number of
frequencies allocated to broadcast television);
therefore, the Court has concluded that this significant difference requires a more lenient First
Amendment analysis for broadcast television."'
Following this comparison, it would appear that
the Pacifica analysis would not sustain a similar
regulation imposed on the cable industry. Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of a TRO without
issuing an opinion.

2

Following these proceedings, section 505 became effective. The enforcement of the statute
opened the door for Playboy to renew its proceedings.8 3 On December 28, 1998, the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware granted
Playboy a declaratory judgment against the enforcement of the statute.8 4 The court held that
although the government proved it had a compelling interest, the statute was nonetheless unconstiwe believe that time-channeling also survives constitutional
scrutiny here"). But see Amicus Brief of the National Cable

Television Association at *8, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999)
(asserting the less than strict scrutiny advanced in Pacificawas
the result of the scarce spectrum available in broadcast;
whereas the less than strict scrutiny should not apply to cable
regulation because the cable programming is "less pervasive"
than broadcast).
86
Cf Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 637 (1994) (stating "the rationale for applying a less rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast
regulation ... does not apply in the context of cable regulation").
s
See id. at 637-38.
82
See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 520 U.S. 1141 (1997); see also United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 705 (D. Del.
1998) (referring to the court's affirmation of the denial of a
temporary restraining order). It is likely that although it recognized the importance of the case, the court did not issue
an opinion because Playboy would have further grounds for
challenging the regulation after it was enforced against the
company. At that point, Playboy would be able to challenge
the substance of section 505.
83 See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
84 See id. at 719.
85
See id. at 717-18.
86
See id. at 718 (in determining whether section 504 was
a less restrictive alternative to section 505, the court ex-

[Vol. 8

tutional because it was not the least restrictive
8 5
means by which to accomplish the goals sought.
Particularly, the court stated that effective enforcement of section 504 was a less restrictive alternative for dealing with the problem of signal

bleed.8 6
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
to reconsider the constitutionality of section 505
and heard oral arguments on November 30,
1999.87

III.

FINDING THE APPROPRIATE FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS

Although the First Amendment initially may
have been intended to protect only political debate, 88 scholars have realized that "even if one
could distinguish between illegitimate and legitimate speech, it may still be necessary to protect all
speech in order to afford real protection for legitimate speech."' Yet, the First Amendment is not
interpreted as an absolute right. 90 It has been said
that "[t] he First Amendment is not the guardian
of unregulated talkativeness." ' I Thus, in order to
implement the appropriate level of protection,
one must first determine the type of speech at issue.

92

plained that it must examine "the relative burden of one solution versus another." The court found that because section

504 provides for "voluntary blocking .... neither Playboy nor
its subscribers will suffer any First Amendment ill-effects...
[and f]or that reason, [section] 504 is not restrictive of anyone's First Amendment rights and is clearly 'less restric-

tive'
87

").

See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,

Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999) (noting probable jurisdiction);
Paige Albiniak, Bunny Gets High Court's Ear; Playboy Argues
Before Supreme Court, BROADCASTING &

CABLE,

Dec. 6, 1999, at

22 (reporting that following the oral arguments, some "observers" on both sides predicted that the Court would rule
for Playboy).
E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrruLAW § 16.6, at 941 n.12 (4th ed. 1991) (stating that "it
has been argued that protection should only be afforded to
explicitly political speech, and not to scientific, literary or ob88

See JOHN

TiONAL

scene speech").
89 id.at § 16.6, 941.
90 See id. at § 16.7, 942 (stating that "[a]n absolute right,
by definition, is not subject to balancing").
911
Id. at § 16.6, 939-40 (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEEC-I AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GOVERNMENT no. 26
(1948)).
92
See id. at § 16.7, 943 (comparing Justice Black's absolutist approach to the First Amendment with Justice Harlan's
balancing approach; also noting that "Harlan's balancing approach is not inconsistent with the language of the first
amendment. It is not 'speech' that is being absolutely pro-

2000]

De Facto Censorship

Levels of First Amendment Protection

A.

To safeguard the various types of speech entitled to varying degrees of First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court has developed different levels of scrutiny. When a regulation is subject
to First Amendment analysis, it is first generally
categorized as a content-based regulation,9 3 an
obscenity regulation,9 4 or a time, place and man95
ner regulation.
Content-based regulations receive strict scrutiny
because they purport to directly regulate the substance of the message.9 11 The Court has determined that there are two requirements that the
government must meet in order to validate a content-based regulation. First, the government must
have a compelling interest to protect, and second,
the regulation must be the least restrictive means
97
available to protect this interest.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the analysis applied to the regulation of obscene speech.
The Court has held that the regulation of obscene
speech will receive less than intermediate scrutiny
because obscene speech has a low social value and
the government has a legitimate interest in protecting society from such speech. 98 In the Playboy
case, both parties stipulated that the speech at issue is indecent rather than obscene.9 9 Therefore,
the regulation at issue will be subject to a higher
tected from restriction but only 'free speech' ").
93 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992)
(describing content-based regulations as presumptively invalid regulations that prohibit speech "solely on the basis of the
subjects the speech address").
94 SeeMiller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stating
that the Court's definition of obscenity has developed into a
three-part test: "(a) whether the average person, applying
contemporary community standards, would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; ...
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the state
law; and (3) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value").
95
See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47
(1986) (upholding a zoning ordinance as a valid time, place
and manner regulation of adult theaters since the regulation
did not "unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication").
96 See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Del. 1998) (stating that
"Congress's targeting of signal bleed of solely sexually explicit programming is a content-based restriction").
See id.
98 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-23 (1973); cf
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 131 (1989) (upholding a regulation banning "obscene"
97

level of scrutiny than one restricting obscene
speech.
Time, place and manner regulations, which receive intermediate scrutiny, lie between contentbased and obscenity regulations.10 0 When the government seeks to restrict speech by regulating the
particular time, place or manner in which it is
presented, the regulation must be "designed to
serve a substantial government interest and . . .
not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of
communication."' 0 ' Generally, regulations aimed
at the secondary effects of the speech are deemed
this "seconcontent-neutral regulations.' 02Under
dary effects" doctrine, the Court has upheld local
zoning ordinances that regulate the location of
adult theaters."' 3 The Court reasoned that a city
could regulate adult theaters if the regulation is
aimed at preventing deterioration of the surrounding neighborhoods rather than suppressing
speech.

0

4

A crucial element of this doctrine is

that the regulated speech must be left with alternative avenues of dissemination.'

B.

0 5

Section 505 is a Content-Based Restriction
That Must be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny.

Section 505 explicitly regulates the content of
video service channels that are primarily dedidial-a-porn telephone messages but invalidating that portion
of the regulation banning all dial-a-porn telephone messages
since indecent (but not obscene) sexual expression is entitled to First Amendment protection).
99 See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 918 F. Supp. 813, 819 (D. Del. 1996) (referring to the
fact that Playboy employs full time attorneys who view all of
the Playboy programming to assure that the programming is
not obscene programming and that it does not violate any
community standards).

100

See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (upholding an adult zoning

regulation prohibiting adult theaters in certain neighborhoods after finding that the regulation served the substantial
government interest of preventing the harmful "secondary

effects" caused by the presence of such theaters and that the
city government allowed for "reasonable alternative avenues
of communication").
101 Id. at 47.
102

103

See id. at 47-48.
See id. at 49; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,

427 U.S. 50, 71-73 (1976) (upholding a zoning regulation of

adult theaters because its purpose was to reduce the deleterious secondary effects that these theaters had on the neighborhoods and not to restrict the offensive speech).
104
105

See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48-49.
See id. at 50.
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cated to adult programming.

0

6

The government

has created a content-based restriction by singling
out the signal bleed from adult programming
channels'1 17-signal bleed from other channels is
not restricted.1 08 Thus, section 505 employs content-based discrimination "in the strong sense of
suppressing a certain form of expression that the
Government dislikes or otherwise wishes to exclude on account of its effects." 10 9 There should
be no justification for anything less than strict
scrutiny to be applied in analyzing this issue.
The government argued that section 505 is
aimed at the deleterious secondary effects of signal bleed rather than at the effects of adult programming, thus necessitating a content-neutral
analysis.°10 This argument may stand if the statute
regulated signal bleed from all adult programming (including that adult content occasionally
appearing on other premium channels). I ' Instead, the argument fails because the government
has chosen to regulate only premium channels
devoted entirely to adult content.' 1 2 If the government is concerned about the effects of signal
bleed from all adult programming, then any channel showing sexually explicit programming
should be required to comply with section 505.1'3
Because this is not the case, the government's ar116

See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.

§ 561 (1994 & Supp. II1 1997).
107
See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Del. 1998).
lOB
See id. at 714-t5 (stating that "[s]ignal bleed from the
Disney Channel, for example, does not come within the purview of the statute"); Amicus Brief of the Media Institute at
*4, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No.
98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999) (referring to the fact that
although Home Box Office shows programming similar to
the Playboy Channel, it is not regulated by section 505).
'09
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727, 802 (1996) (holding, in part, that a regulation
allowing cable operators to prohibit patently offensive and
indecent programming violates the First Amendment). See
also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (stating, "Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid").
'
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (regulating only adult programming that is shown on
channels "primarily dedicated to adult programming").
112
See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Stipp. 772, 785 (D. Del. 1996) (noting that
"[e]ven though § 505 is aimed at the content-neutral objective of preventing signal bleed, the section applies only when
signal bleed occurs during the transmission of 'sexually explicit adult programming or other programming that is indecent' " (quoting § 505, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 561 (1994 &
Supp. 11 1997))).
113 See David L. Htudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine:
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gument will most likely fail. The Court therefore
will treat the provision as restraining content, thus
invoking strict scrutiny.

1.

Applying Strict Scrutiny to Section 505:
Establishing Compelling Interests

When the Court applies strict scrutiny, the government will first have to establish that the regulation is intended to protect compelling interests. 1 14 The government contends that the
following interests are compelling:
(1) the Government's interest in the well-being of the
nation's youth-the need to protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related material; 2) the
Government's interest in supporting parental claims of
authority in their own household-the need to protect
parents' rights to inculcate morals and beliefs on their
children; and 3) the Government's interest in ensuring
the individual's right to be left alone in the privacy of
his or her home-the need to protect households from
unwanted sexual communications. 115

Following Supreme Court precedent, the lower
courts agreed that these are indeed, compelling
6
interests for the government to promote."
Although these interests may be compelling, however, there is little evidence to show that signal
bleed threatens these interests.' 17 Given the mini"The Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms," 37 WASHBURN
L.J. 55, 59 (1997) (stating that "t]he secondary effects doctrine has become a favorite tool for government' officials who
seek to disguise content-based regulations").
114
See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715 (D. Del. 1998) (describing the
procedure the court states that the government bears the
burden of establishing' that "its interests are compelling and
that the means chosen 'are careflly tailored to achieve those
ends' ").
115

Id.

I 16 See, e.g., id. at 715-18; Playboy Entertainment Group, 945
F. Supp. at 785-86.
117
See Amicus Brief for Sexuality Scholars, Researchers
and Therapists at *15, United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., No. 98-1682 (filed Sept. 24, 1999) [hereinafter Sexuality Scholars Brief] (asserting that the government
has not established its burden of proving a compelling interest in protecting children from signal bleed exists since it did
not present sufficient evidence of harm); but see 16A Am. Jur.
2d Constitutional Law § 171 (1998) (stating, "There. is a
strong presumption that a legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws
are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and
that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds")
Furthermore, if evidence of certain facts is required for a legislature to properly pass a statute, "it is presumed that such
evidence was actually and properly before the legislative
body." Id.
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mal evidence, it is argued that the government
has not met its burden of proving that signal
bleed from sexually explicit programming is
harmful to children.'

's

In 1996, the district court stated that the results
of a study conducted by the government's expert
witness were "anecdotal and possibly misleading." 119 Playboy's expert witnesses testified that
"there is no empirical evidence of psychological
harm to minors from exposure to sexually explicit
videos, no less to signal bleed," 120 and the govern2
ment's witness did not refute that testimony.' '
Again in 1998, the district court stated that the
government had presented "no clinical evidence
linking child viewing of pornography to psychological harms."122 Despite these findings, the district court held that the government had met its
burden because only "some evidence of harm
short of definitive scientific proof must be
presented." ' 123 Arguably, the court relied on "dubious and inadequate evidence" to find that the
government had established a compelling interest.

124

It is clear that the Supreme Court recognizes
the importance of protecting children from indecent material. 125 However, no case has yet asked
the Court whether signal bleed of indecent material is a potential harm to children. The Court has
not "even contemplated the claim that fleeting
sounds or images from indecent signal bleed
could be harmful to youth." 12 6 Rather, the government's argument is based on an analogy between the effect of television violence on children
118

See Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at *15.

Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States,
918 F. Supp. 772, 813 (D. Del. 1996).
120
Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at *3.
119

121

See id.

United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D. Del. 1998).
122

123

Id.

See Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at *6-7.
See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 715-16 (D. Del. 1998) (referring to
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(holding that a school's disciplinary actions taken as a result
of a student's speech using indecent speech did not violate of
the First Amendment); Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 58 F.3d. 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding the case to
redesign the FCC regulation that prohibited indecent programming from being shown between 6 a.m. and midnight;
the court ruled that the regulation was unconstitutional after
applying strict scrutiny-it was not the least restrictive means
to achieve the government's interest); Ginsburg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding a New York statute that prohibited the sale of obscene materials to minors after finding
124

125

and the effect of pornography on children. 27
While the government's evidence is far from conclusive, it is likely that the Court will accept the
minimal evidence based on its precedent of pro28
tecting children from indecent material.1
2. Finding the Least Restrictive Means
The crux of this issue lies within the second
prong of the Court's analysis: whether this regulation is the least restrictive means available to meet
the government's asserted interest. 29 The government asserts that this regulation is the only viable
means by which it can satisfy its compelling interests.1

30

However, there are several alternatives

that can satisfy the government's interest in protecting children from indecent programming.
a.

Section 504

First, section 504 is a viable and a less restrictive
alternative. Under section 504, any cable subscriber is entitled to request a lockbox, in which
any programming (whether or not it is sexually
explicit) could be completely blocked, free of
charge.' 3' The United States District Court for

the District of Delaware noted that the "basic difference between section 504 and section 505 is in
determining who takes the initiative to remediate
the signal bleed problem."' 132 While section 505

requires the MSOs to take the initiative and fully
scramble the adult programming channels, section 504 enables parents to have the adult prothat the statute bore a rational relation to the government's
interest in protecting minors from obscene materials); Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (remanding a
challenge to the Georgia laws that regulated adult theaters
and the obscene material that is shown therein)).
126
Sexuality Scholars Brief, supra note 117, at *8.
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Stipp. 2d at 716.
127
See supra note 125, discussing the Court's precedent.
128
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 717
129
(assuming that the government's interest may be compelling,
the court next must determine "whether § 505 is narrowly
tailored to serve that end and whether it is the least restrictive alternative").
See id.; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875
130
(1997) (stating that a governmental interest in protecting
children "does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression
of speech addressed to adults;" additionally, that "the government may not 'reduc[e] the adult population . . . to ...

only

what is fit for children' " (citing Denver Area EdtIc.
Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 802 (1996))).
131
See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C.

§ 560 (1994 & Supp. I 1997).
132

Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Stipp. 2d at 717.
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gramming channels fully scrambled upon their
request. 133
In order to determine which provision is less restrictive, it is important to look at the practical implications of the provision. Section 505 has compelled the majority of MSOs to comply by
initiating time-channeling of the adult programming channels. 34 Thus, section 505 has diminished "Playboy's opportunities to convey, and the
opportunity of Playboy's viewers to receive, protected speech."' 135 Alternatively, section 504 is significantly less restrictive of First Amendment
rights because it amounts to voluntary blocking;
no cable subscriber will be prohibited from viewing their choice of programming.

36

In addition to being a less restrictive alternative
to the challenged regulation, section 504 must
also be as effective as the challenged regulation. 137 The district court found that section 504
was an effective alternative if cable subscribers
were given adequate notice of its availability.' 38
The court encouraged Playboy, through its contractual obligations with the MSOs, to ensure that
MSOs give adequate notice.

39

In opposition to

the court's "enhanced version of section 504," the
government argued that it has an obligation to
protect all children from signal bleed, including
those children whose parents, through "inertia,
indifference, or distraction," have not taken the
initiative to block it.140 When the Supreme Court
raised this issue at oral arguments, counsel for
Playboy responded by asserting that effective notice, through video announcements and written
notice, would be an adequate way to notify the

parents. 41 It was also stated that if the parents did
not respond to such notice, the lack of response
would serve as further evidence that the parents
were not concerned about the potential of a sig133 See Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. i1 1997); Telecommunications Act of
1996 § 504, 47 U.S.C. § 560.
134
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
135
Id. at 718.
136
See id. (explaining that any cable subscriber who requests a blocking device will be provided one free of charge,
while all Playboy subscribers will be able to receive the programming 24 hours a day).
137
See id. (applying this analysis and noting that the less
restrictive alternative must also be a "viable alternative").
138
See id. at 719.
139 See id. at 720.
140
See Supreme Court Appellant's Brief, supra note 54, at
*33.
141
See Supreme Court Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at

nal bleed problem.

142

The effectiveness of section 504 is inherently
tied to its economic feasibility. The district court
in its findings of fact appeared to accept the government's findings that if only three to six percent of cable subscribers requested lockboxes, the
cost of such distribution would exceed the "breakeven" point, defined as "the point at which the
cost of distributing lockboxes would exhaust all of
a cable system's adult channel revenues."' 14 3 The

court also appeared to accept the theory that such
an economic impact would cause the cable operators to cease carrying the adult channels. 14 4 In

contrast, Playboy presented information asserting
that the government has "vastly overestimate[d]
compliance costs" and the break-even point is
when eighty percent of cable subscribers request
lockboxes.

45

While the court acknowledged the

government's statistics in its findings of fact, it did
146
not address the issue in its conclusions of law.
While the Court will undoubtedly question the
economic feasibility of section 504 (and it does
not appear that the Court is satisfied with the district court's treatment of this issue),' 147 the question it must ultimately address is whether section
504 is less restrictive of our First Amendment
rights than section 505, not whether it is more intrusive into the MSOs' wallets.
b.

The V-Chip

While the awareness of section 504 would help
to prevent signal bleed in homes where it is unwanted, there are still other alternatives to blocking signal bleed. As technology advances, more
parental control devices become available; for example, the v-chip.'

48

The v-chip, in conjunction

with a rating system, can be used to block specific
*44-45.

See id.
143 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 713 (D. Del. 1998) (examining the evi142

dence, the court found that that the -"distribution of boxes is
not feasible for a cable system" and thus "[e]conomic theory
would suggest that profit-maximizing cable operators would
cease carriage of adult channels").
144
See id.
145
See Supreme Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at
*47.
14"
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d at
713-20.
147
See Supreme Court Oral Arguments, supra note 54, at
*52-54.
148
See Amy Fitzgerald Ryan, Don't Touch That V-Chip: A
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programs that parents do not want their children
to see.

14 9

The v-chip is a device implanted into

televisions that reads the rating information encoded on the television programs and blocks the
programs based on the ratings specified by the
parent. 150 On March 12, 1998, the FCC adopted

an order implementing a voluntary rating system
and requirements for technical television equipment that would enable the v-chip to be a viable
alternative for parents. 15 1 The rules implemented
by the FCC required half of all television models
thirty-three centimeters and larger to be
equipped with the v-chip by July 1, 1999, and all
such models to contain the v-chip by January 1,
2000.152 At the time of the implementation of the
v-chip regulation, the FCC addressed the potential First Amendment issues that could arise because the v-chip was potentially a speech regulation.'

53

Upon review, the FCC stated that the

regulation "prudently provided an alternative to a
government-created, government-policed scheme
for judging the content of video programming:
the establishment of a private, voluntary ratings
54
system by video programming distributors."1
c.

Safe-HarborHours

The government is likely to argue that regardless of the preceding discussion, section 505 is
constitutional because it allows for adult programConstitutionalDefense of the Television Program RatingProvisions
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 87 GEO. L.J. 823, 825
(1999) (defining the v-chip as a "device that allows viewers to
block the display of programs that carry a common rating").
149
See Commission Finds Industry Video ProgrammingRating
System Acceptable, Adopts Technical Requirements to Enable Blocking of Video Programming(Rpt. No. GN 98-3), FCC News, Mar.
12, 1998 [hereinafter Rating System Release]
150
See Viewing Television Responsibly: The V-Chip (visited
Jan. 22, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/vchip>. But see Supreme Court
Appellant's Brief, supra note 54, at *36 n.25 (stating that Playboy had conceded that the v-chip did not address the problem of signal bleed "because the imperfect scrambling that
creates the problem of signal bleed distorts or obliterates the
program classification (ratings) codes that the v-chip must interpret in order to block the programming); cf Supreme
Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at *42 n.59 (agreeing
that Playboy acknowledged that the v-chip was not designed
to prevent signal bleed but disagreeing that the v-chip does
not work to block signal bleed because since the trial, the
FCC has adopted rules that enable parents to block unrated
programming through the v-chip).
151
See Viewing Television Responsibly: The V-Chip, (visited
Jan, 22, 2000) <www.fcc.gov/vchip> (explaining that the rating system applies to all television programming except news,
sports, and certain premium movies; children's shows are
rated TV-Y, TV-Y7, and TV-Y7-FV; general programming is

ming to be shown during the safe harbor
hours. 155 Although use of safe harbor hours was
validated by the Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,1 5 1 crucial differences between Pacifica and
the present case may make safe-harbor hours inapplicable.
First, the narrow holding in Pacifica applied
only to one specific broadcast. 15 7 The Court considered the FCC's ability to regulate one performance after that performance had been broadcast
over radio.'58 The Court "emphatically declined
to authorize the FCC 'to edit proposed in advance
and to excise material considered inappropriate
for the airwaves'

broadcasts."' 159 Because

the

Court has rejected prior restraint as a method for
regulating indecent speech, Pacifica cannot be
used to automatically validate safe harbor hours
on cable television.
Second, Pacifica reviewed a broadcast that was
disseminated on public radio; the fact that the
regulation in question refers to cable television
changes the scope of the inquiry drastically. One
relevant issue is that, at the time of Pacifica, the
objected broadcast was a "dramatic departure
from traditional program content." 6" In contrast,
the adult programming that is regulated by section 505 has regularly been available on cable television.' 6 ' Furthermore, unlike radio broadcasts,
which were deemed pervasive in Pacifica,cable television is not available to everyone.'Il-Cable telerated TV-G, TV-PG, TV-14, and TV-MA).
152
See Rating System Release, supra note 149.
15
See In re Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Video Programming Ratings,
Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd. 8232, 8247 (1998) (separate
statement of Comm. Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth)
154
Id.
155
See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 717 (D. Del. 1998); see also Becker v.
FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (referring to the safe
harbor hours as "broadcast Siberia").
156

438 U.S. 726 (1978).

See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742 (holding that the decision
only applied to the "specific factual context").
157

158

See id.

Supreme Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at
*22-23.
160
Id. at *23 (citing FINAL REPORT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPrlY 282 (1986)).
161
See Supreme Court Appellee's Brief, supra note 70, at
*23.
162
See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (D. Del. 1998) (referring to the
subscription prices for various cable television packages); but
see Reno, 521 U.S. at 854 (stating, "Unlike communications
received by radio or television, 'the receipt of information on
the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more delib159
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vision is subscription programming that also offers numerous options for blocking unwanted
programming.

63

Thus, the safe harbor hours that

were used in Pacifica are no longer needed because there are other ways to prevent children
from seeing or hearing the adult programming. 164
C.
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tional level rather than through an individual
community's standard.' 7' In Reno, the Court specifically noted that such standards must be
'judged by contemporary community standards"
rather than by a "national floor for socially redeeming value."' 72 Therefore, the question of
who will determine the indecency of the programming is sure to raise issues for the Court.

Section 505 May Fail Due to Vagueness

One final issue that the Court will undoubtedly
address is whether section 505 can survive a constitutional challenge of vagueness. The District
Court for the District of Delaware did not address
this issue in its opinion in 1998.1' However, in its
review of the preliminary injunction, the court
ruled that section 505 clearly survived Playboy's
vagueness claim based on the Court's decision in
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium.'6

6

However, there is a strong possibility that

the Court will find section 505 to be vague. The
Court is likely to focus on Reno v. ACLU, where it
invalidated portions of the Communications Decency Act due to vagueness.

16 7

In that decision,

the Court noted that the statute was a contentbased regulation and that the criminal punishment for violation was severe.' 6 8 While section
505 does not impose a severe criminal penalty, it
16
is a content-based regulation.' 9

Although section 505 initially did not define
"indecency," the enacted regulation defined indecent sexually explicit adult programming as "any
programming that describes or depicts sexual or
excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner as measured by contemporary community standards for the cable or other multichannel video programming distribution
medium."'1 70 Therefore, pursuant to section 505,

the FCC will determine what is indecent at a naerate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and thereby to use the Internet
unattended.' "). While the Court groups all television and radio together in the previous sentence, cable television is not
as readily accessible as public radio. Furthermore, adult programming channels are generally not placed in the same vicinity of children's channels, thts making it harder and more
unlikely for children to access these channels.
163
See supra part IV.B (discussing the alternatives to
time-channeling).
164

165

See id.
See Playboy Entertainment Group, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702.

166
See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United
States, 945 F. Supp. 772, 791 (D. Del. 1996) (citing Denver

IV.

CONCLUSION: SECTION 505 IS AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CENSORSHIP OF
SPEECH

As the Supreme Court reviews Playboy's challenge to these restrictive government regulations,
it is likely to address both the First Amendment
issue, under a strict scrutiny standard, and the
vagueness doctrine. When the Court applies strict
scrutiny, it is likely to find that the government
has proven a compelling interest, but that section
505 is not the least restrictive means available to
protect that interest. Given the many available options for preventing children's exposure to indecent programming, it is difficult to say that section
505 is the least restrictive alternative. To be certain, there is no replacement for parental supervision. However, where parental supervision is not
possible, parents still have various available safeguards. Concerned parents who do not have time
to regulate every program their children watch
can utilize the v-chip or request a free lockbox
from their cable operator.
This government regulation is aimed at protecting children; there are various other ways to accomplish this goal. Unfortunately, the government chose the means that is most restrictive of
adults' rights. Section 505 places a tremendous
burden on the financial capability of adult proArea Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996)) (referring to the Court's flat rejection of the plain-

tiff's argument in Denver Consortiumthat the challenged regulations were unconstitutionally vague since "the use of accepted terms imbued the statute with meaning").
167 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
168
See id. at 871-72.
169 See id. at 872 (stating that a vague, content-based regulation poses "special First Amendment concerns because of
its obvious chilling effect on the free speech").
17o) Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 505, 47 U.S.C.
§ 561 (1994 & Supp. Il 1997); see also 47 C.F.R. § 76.227
(1998).
171 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 862-64.
172

Id. at 873.
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gramming channels, and more importantly, it
places a substantial burden on free speech.
There is no doubt that much attention will directed at the Court as it decides yet another First
Amendment case. While First Amendment jurisprudence has been relatively unclear, the Court
has a chance to clarify its position on contentbased regulations. First, the Court should determine whether the government's undocumented
evidence is sufficient to establish a compelling interest; the government's evidence on this point
was minimal at best. Second, the Court should

also make it clear that the "least restrictive" means
must be used if the government wants to achieve
its compelling interest. Because there are multiple viable alternatives, the government has not
used the least restrictive means of regulation
through section 505. It is undoubtedly clear that
on November 30, 1999, at oral arguments before
the Supreme Court, the government appealed to
the Court's conscience to protect our children
from a societal ill. However, the Court can best
protect our children by preserving the integrity of
the First Amendment.

